Motivation. Due to technological advances such as the Internet and mobile computing, Security has become a serious challenge involving several disciplines of Computer Science. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the analysis of security protocols and one promising approach is the development of formalisms that model communicating processes, in particular Process Calculi. The results are so far encouraging although most remains to be done.
interpretations. The expected outcome is two-fold. We will advance the CCP theory to deal with new challenging concepts from Security and produce a specification language and tools to model and automatically verify security protocols.
Approach. The approach of the project will be to give a CCP account of a representative calculus for security protocols. We will use CCP constraint systems to represent a logic to reason about the information an attacker can deduce from the information accumulated in the monotonic store. The CCP linear-time temporal logic and associated complete inference system in [NPV02] and the verification results in [Val05] can be used to specify and prove safety properties of protocol runs. Now, most security protocols use mechanisms to allow generation of nonces (or names). Therefore, we shall need to provide CCP with such mechanisms which have been far too little considered in CCP. One approach to this problem will be to use constraint systems based on Nominal Logic [Pit01] , a modern logic to reason about name freshness. Another possibility is to extend CCP with an operation that provides name generation. To keep the dual operational and declarative view of CCP, the extended language should also have a logic interpretation. In fact, we have recently studied the issue of name generation in [PSVV06] where we proved that existential quantification can replace name generation in a meaningful process calculus.
